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The present study tries to investigate on the dynamics between the level of transparency of international treaty 
negotiations and the success of European Commission negotiators in achieving their particular political interests. 
Drawing upon an alternated version of Robert Putnam's two-level game approach, two distinct hypotheses are 
established. First, a low level of transparency of international treaty negotiations increases the amount of gains 
available to European Commission negotiators at the international level. Second, a low level of transparency of 
international treaty negotiations decreases the likelihood of ratification at the non-international level. These 
hypothesis are tested against the case of the international Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
negotiations and the subsequent ratification procedure that took place between the years 2005 and 2012. 
Empirically, it can be confirmed that the ACTA talks' low level of transparency detached the usually intertwined 
international, supranational, and domestic negotiation levels and thus increased the political leeway available to 
the Commission, leading to a treaty text that reflected its tough stance on intellectual property rights regulation. 
However, the low level of transparency also resulted in the Commission's lack of information about the true 
nature of negotiation outcomes that were acceptable to both the public and parliamentary majorities. Indeed, 
following a lively campaign against the treaty that was predominantly coordinated via the internet and social 
networks, ACTA ultimately failed ratification both on Member State and Community levels. In a nutshell: When 
the debated issues are controversial and salient to the public, the European Commission is likely to fail reaping 
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Ever since the representatives of the governments of the European Union (EU) declared as part of the 
Final Act of the Treaty of Maastricht (ToM) that "transparency of the decision-making process 
strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration” 
(ToM 1992), EU bodies have agreed upon numerous declarations of intent to enhance the transparency of 
its political affairs. Especially the European Commission (EC), responsible for both proposing legislation 
and implementing decisions at the European level, and thus holding an "unprecedented" (Karayanidi 
2011: 1446) level of regulatory power, has been keen to proclaim its willingness to contribute to that 
endeavor. Acknowledging that the planning and development of regulations is an issue of concern for 
foreign and domestic public spheres, the EC agreed within the 2002 Transatlantic Guidelines on 
Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency that “[t]ransparency is necessary to ensure that these concerns 
are properly understood and taken into account in this process” (European Commission 2002: 5). 
Furthermore, to create more opportunities for stakeholders to participate actively in EU policy and to 
“ensure that the Union is open to public scrutiny and accountable for its work” (European Commission 
2006a: 5), the EC launched the European Transparency Initiative in 2005, promising progress on a broad 
spectrum of transparency-related issues. 
The track record appears to be mixed. The Commission has been improving public accessibility of 
information about meeting records, the recipients of EU funds, members of expert groups and lobbyists 
through initiatives such as the “Transparency Portal” (European Commission 2012a). Particularly when 
the EC acted as an authorized representative negotiating international treaties on behalf of the EU, 
however, its conduct continued to provoke calls for increased openness and more opportunities of 
political participation in diverse cases such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Walter 2001), 
fisheries agreements with West African nations (Lankester and Diouf 2002), the US-EU SWIFT 
Agreement (Fox 2012), or the India-EU Free Trade Agreement (Eberhardt and Kumar 2010). 
The Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), effective since December 2009, established amendments to the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome that provided for a strengthened role of the European Parliament (EP) when it comes to the 
negotiation and adoption of international agreements. Although some observers estimate that this step 
increases the EC's incentive to increase the openness of negotiations (Richardson 2012: 24), others hold 
that the “extent of the impact of reforms […] on the EU’s external trade relations is still not entirely clear” 
(Pollet-Fort 2010: 3). Considering the potentially tense relationship between the EC's role as leading 
negotiator and transparency-related demands of both legislative bodies overseeing the ratification process 
and the general public alike, seeking to understand possible gains and pitfalls transparency can hold for the 
EC's prospects of goal achievement in international treaty negotiations appears to be a rewarding 
endeavor. Therefore, the present paper seeks to answer the following research question: 
 
How does the level of transparency of international treaty negotiations  
affect the success of EU negotiators? 
 
The remainder of the present paper proceeds as follows: Fist, the current body of academic literature on 
the effect of transparency on political processes within the EU will be reviewed. Second, drawing upon an 
adapted version of the two-level game model by Robert D. Putnam, two hypotheses will be devised and 
accompanied by a description of the utilized research methods. Third, the hypotheses will be tested on the 
case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations that took place between June of 
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2005 and December 2010. Fourth, the results of the analysis will be summarized and outlook for future 
research will be given. 
2. Literature review 
Transparency as an analytical category of the European political process has traditionally been receiving a 
considerable amount of scholarly attention. Arguably, this is due to the ubiquitously present issue of a 
generally perceived democratic deficit within the supranational level of European policy-making. As 
reflected by the following overview of the scientific discourse, the arguments proposed predominantly 
refer to normative considerations and potential changes in process efficiency. 
As for the former group, many scholars implicitly assume transparency to be unambiguously beneficial to 
political processes. One of the most frequently praised benefits is the increased accountability of public 
officials. As an early proponent, Jeremy Bentham argued already in the early 19th century that within a 
legislative context, “publicity would constrain members of the assembly to perform their duty” and secure 
people's “assent to the measures of the legislature” (Bentham 1816: 29). More recently, scholars such as 
Robert Keohane (2006) and Adrienne Héritier argue that transparency, combined with mutual horizontal 
control and competition among multiple authorities serves to reinforce democratic support and 
accountability (Héritier 1999; 2003). On the same note, Gronbech-Jensen (1998) asserts that 
“Scandinavian style transparency” with its provision of extensive public access to official documents, files 
and registers is perceived in Northern Europe as an important means of holding public policy-makers 
accountable and therefore should be implemented also on the supranational level. 
The analytical concept of “input-oriented legitimacy”, introduced by Fritz Scharpf (1999) to describe the 
increasing legitimacy of political systems through a linkage of political decisions with citizen's preferences 
(direct participation, representation on the basis of elections, and recognition of the interests of social 
groupings) has spurred a great deal of publications in favor of enhanced transparency. Grace Skogstad 
(2003) for example argues that “output-oriented legitimacy” (legitimacy through satisfactory policy 
outcomes) is no longer a sufficient basis for EU-level governance. He shows along the case of regulation 
on genetically modified organisms (GMO) that instead, the EU polity's input legitimacy ought to be 
improved through measures such as increased accessibility and network governance. Jan Scholte highlights 
that previous efforts to improve openness have been merely the “tip of the proverbial iceberg”, and 
demands greater positive legitimation “with more civil society engagement, covering more [...] institutions 
and extending through more stages of the policy process” (Scholte 2007: 306). 
On a less normative note, a considerable amount of studies have been undertaken to evaluate the impact 
of increased transparency on negotiation efficiency. Authors are mainly divided in two camps, 
accentuating the potential advantages or disadvantages, respectively. Representing the former group, Jon 
Elster puts forward the notion of a “civilizing force of hypocrisy”. He argues that the “presence of a 
public makes it especially hard to appear motivated merely by self-interest. Even if one’s fellow assembly 
members would not be shocked, the audience would be” (Elster 1998: 111). While John Peterson shows 
that the EC's efforts to improve transparency were designed to “cope with its chronic management 
problems” such as the division between different organizational units of the Commission, strong loyalties 
of policy-concerned Directorates-General (DGs) to their specific clientele, unclear rules governing access 
to information, and intense rivalries between DGs (Peterson 1995: 473), Hagemann and Lenz (2012) 
make a dedicated case that transparency may increase the likelihood to reach agreement, the robustness of 
agreements, and the procedural efficiency of negotiation processes. 
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Applying a contrary focus, other scholars argue that apart of possible upsides, transparency generates 
various constraints for the efficiency of negotiations, such as posturing of representatives through overly 
aggressive bargaining behavior (Stasavage 2004: 695; Checkel 2001: 554). Furthermore,  authors show 
through the application of thorough case analysis of the EU Council of Ministers (Stasavage 2005), the US 
Federal Reserve (Stasavage and Meade 2008), crisis negotiations (Leventoglu and Tarar 2005), and the EU 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) (Lewis 2005; Lewis 2010) that the willingness of 
negotiators to strike bargains, deliberate on positions and offer dissenting opinions might decrease with 
the introduction of transparency measures. Considering the example of US administrative politics, Martin 
Shapiro warns repeatedly (Shapiro 1996; 1997) that an increase in interest group access and representation 
necessarily entails cumbersome rule-making procedures and thus may create a trade-off between the goals 
of efficiency and legitimacy. He argues that the rule-making process, intended to be quick and informal, 
becomes “incredibly slow, formal and judicially supervised” and “so tendentious that the agencies are 
seeking ways to make policy without having to make a rule” (Shapiro 1996: 39). 
Reviewing the scholarly debate, it appears as that its contributors who focus on either normative 
considerations in terms of accountability and legitimacy of political systems and those who make isolated 
evaluations of possible gains or losses of efficiency with regards to a singular political arena tend to ignore 
the complex interplay of institutional checks and balances that is constantly at work within Western 
democracies over the course of such deliberations. The contribution of transparency (or lack thereof) to 
the EC's chances of attending its political goals can not be answered sufficiently with this kind of 
theoretical and empirical toolkit. Michelle Egan supposes accordingly regarding international negotiations 
that “domestic policies are not exogenous, and the ability to maneuver at the European level may be 
constrained by what is domestically acceptable in each member state” (Egan 1998: 495). In order to be 
able to systemically address the dynamics between member states (MS) with their domestic constituencies, 
the EU polity, and the realm of international negotiations sufficiently, I will turn to an analytical model 
that was specifically modeled to recognize these factors. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Generation of hypothesis 
Robert Putnam's (1988) two-level game model has been applied frequently for analyzes of negotiations 
between nation states (Zartman 1993; Schmidt 1996; Patterson 1997; Collinson 1999; Meunier 2000; 
Pollack 2003; Frennhoff Larsén 2007). In order to understand the conduct and political outcomes of 
negotiations more accurately than competing models, it spreads the focus on two different levels of 
analysis: The international level focuses on the ways how representatives of national governments interact 
with each other on the international negotiation stage and at the same time seek to maximize their own 
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments" 
(Putnam 1988: 434). The  domestic level, in turn, focuses on the national realm in which political and 
societal actors seek to pursue their interests by pressuring its representatives to negotiate favorable results 
(Putnam: 434). 
In the case of the EU as a participant in negotiations, however, there is an additional level of analysis 
required. The Community level with its unique “federal-like polity” structure (Patterson 1997: 141), in 
which MS attempt to achieve domestic goals while they simultaneously pursue cooperative integration, 
serves both as an additional international arena of negotiations between MS and as another domestic 
forum scrutinizing the negotiations between EU representatives and a third party (Frennhoff Larsén 2007: 
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859). Usually, and so will be done here, scholars of EU politics applying a three-level game approach refer 
to the level of international negotiations as Level I, the level of negotiations within and across EU 
institutions as Level II, and the level of negotiations between different domestic groups within MS as 
Level III (Patterson 1997; Frenhoff Larsén 2007). 
What makes Putnam's multi-level approach both intriguing and the political complexities for the players 
“staggering” (Putnam 1988: 434), is the notion that negotiations do not proceed in a linear way from one 
level to the other, but instead happen simultaneously at all levels. Occurrences at one stage of the 
negotiation "reverberate" (Putnam 1988: 456) at the others with the consequence that strategies and 
outcomes at different levels of the game simultaneously affect one another. Considering this intertwined 
relationship of dependence, the author introduces the concept of “win-sets” in order to be able to 
hypothesize upon the range of possible Level I deals that satisfy the remaining level's key players 
sufficiently enough to become adopted. He therefore argues that larger win-sets make international 
agreement more likely and conversely, a smaller win-set renders negotiations more prone to break down 
(Putnam 1988: 437). 
According to Putnam, the size of the win-sets is affected by three main factors. First, it "depends on the 
distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions” among Level III constituents (Putnam 1988: 
442). Second, the size of the win-set depends on Level II and III political institutions, especially 
considering ratification procedures, possible veto players, and the independence of central decision makers 
from their constituents. Evidently, low hurdles of domestic ratification, absence of veto players, and a 
high level of decision maker's autonomy increase the size of the win-set (Putnam 1988: 448-450). Third, 
the size of the win set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators. Although representatives are 
expected to act merely as serving agents on behalf of their domestic constituencies, a multi-level game 
follows the logic of principal-agent analysis and posits that negotiators are able to pursue their own 
interests. If their willingness to compromise is limited enough, this can even lead to “voluntary defection” 
from the talks (Putnam 1988: 456). Representatives can also take advantage of a small domestic win-set in 
order to impose pressure on other parties to back down from contested claims, which may lead to an 
increase of gains from the international bargain. 
Keisuke Iida, however, made a valuable contribution to our understanding of multi-level games in terms 
of transparency through highlighting the importance of information available to the actors included in the 
game. First, he notes, the negotiation strategy to push adversaries around on one's own domestic 
constraints can only work effectively if these have sufficient information about the actual limits of one's 
win-set (Iida 1993: 417). Second, insufficient knowledge of a representative about the own domestic 
political environment can be fatal to international agreement. One the one hand, this is the case because 
the size of the Level I win-set decreases when societal actors perceive costs of no agreement to be low. If 
a negotiator does not take this perception carefully into account at the international bargaining table he 
might be forced into “involuntary defection” (Putnam  1988: 438). On the other hand, even considering 
for the costs of no agreement to be significant, a negotiator who is unaware of the real nature of  Level III 
constituent's preferences might settle on a Level I deal that finds itself outside of the domestic win-set. 
Obviously, the danger of involuntary defection increases further when powerful Level II and III veto 
players are to be coped with on the way to ratification. To conclude, “it is likely that in situations where 
there are high domestic constraints, significant uncertainty, and domestic veto authority, international 
negotiations will break-down frequently” (Schmidt 1996: 120). 
Looking back on the previous remarks about the analytical model of three-level games, where does this 
take us in terms of the present research question? In what way is it possible to hypothesize about the 
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effects of (non-)transparency on the success of EU negotiators in international negotiations? First, it is 
appropriate to assume that the extent of constraints imposed by actors at Level II and III on the conduct 
of Level I negotiation depends on the amount of information and access these actors get about the state 
of deliberations. If Putnam's logic builds on the notion that multiple negotiation stages are intertwined, 
then a lack of transparency of Level I negotiations untwines this relationship of dependence, consequently 
leading to an enlarged win-set and thus increasing the gains available at the international level. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
A low level of transparency of international treaty negotiations 
increases the amount of gains available to EU negotiators at the international level. 
 
Second, for the very same dynamic, a low level of transparency and the resulting Level I negotiator's lack 
of sufficient information about the real nature of non-international stakeholder's true win-set should 
increase the likelihood of involuntary defection. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
A low level of transparency of international treaty negotiations 
decreases the likelihood of ratification at the non-international level. 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to be able to examine these hypotheses in a scientifically credible way, some clarifications on 
methodological proceedings shall be made in advance. First, it shall be set that the hypotheses will be 
tested against the case of the negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the 
following ratification procedure. Therefore, the time frame of analysis shall begin with the Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi's initial treaty proposal at the Gleneagles G8 summit on July 6th 2005 
(Gerhardsen 2005) and end with the European Parliament's rejection of the treaty on July 4th 2012 
(European Parliament 2012a). Second, the term “transparency” needs to be clarified. Arguably the best 
toolkit available to evaluate the record on transparency of EU negotiators are the guidelines that the EU 
chief representative in such negotiations, the EC, has agreed upon itself. Further, transparency-related 
practices at alternative venues of international negotiations on intellectual property law (IP) shall be used 
to put the ACTA negotiation's level of transparency into perspective. Third, when are the hypotheses to 
be considered verified?  
 
Hypothesis 1 shall be considered verified, when 
a) the level of transparency of the international treaty negotiation can be evaluated as low, and 
b) the low level of transparency is taken advantage of by EC negotiation representatives in order to 
achieve gains at the international stage that would not be reachable considering a higher level of 
transparency. 
 
Hypothesis 2 shall be considered verified, when 
a) the level of transparency of the international treaty negotiation can be evaluated as low, 
b) the low level of transparency directly results in significant obstacles to ratification at the non-
international stage that would not exist considering a higher level of transparency. 
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Fourth, the case study will be examined predominantly through qualitative content analysis. This research 
method appears to be most appropriate to exploit the wide variety of text-based sources such as draft 
treaties, meeting records, position papers, interviews, and secondary sources as efficiently as possible. 
However, wherever possible and deemed reasonable, qualitative data such as poll and voting results or 
statistics shall be drawn upon. 
4. Test of hypothesis 
4.1  Enlarging the win-set: The Commission negotiating ACTA at the 
international stage 
4.1.1 The interests of the Commission 
In order to properly test the hypothesis that a low level of transparency of international treaty negotiations 
increases the amount of gains available to EU representatives at the international level through lessening 
the extent of constraints imposed by actors at Level II and III, it is important to determine whether the 
negotiators follow political goals that are independent from domestic actors. In the case of ACTA, a 
plurilateral regulatory agreement that covers standards for intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement, 
the Commission's stance has become clear early on.  
First, on the political field of inner-European lawmaking, the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
Directive (IPRED), a long-running proposal by the EC to improve intellectual property law within the EU 
passed in March 2004. However, while it arranged for additional confiscatory and subpoena powers to 
litigants in civil IPR cases, the EC's proposal to increase penalties and criminalize commercial-style IPR 
infringements got dropped during the legislative procedure (EUR-Lex 2006). Holding on to the issue, the 
official EC “[s]trategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries” of May 2005 
asserted that IPR violations “continue to increase, having reached, in recent years, industrial proportions. 
This happens despite the fact that, by now, most of the WTO members have adopted legislation 
implementing minimum standards of IPR enforcement. It is, therefore, essential for the European Union 
to increasingly focus on vigorous and effective implementation of the enforcement legislation” (European 
Commission 2005a: C129/3). The subsequent months have witnessed an avid promotion of this view by 
EC members. EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson stated in September 2005 in a speech at the 
Foreign Policy Centre Brighton that “we  desperately  need  better  recognition  of  intellectual  property  
rights  […] and  an  improved  IPR  enforcement.   This  is  key  to  Europe’s  position  in  the knowledge 
economy” (European Commission 2005b: 4). The report “Global Europe – competing in the world” of 
October 2006 which also became part of the EC's growth strategy “Europe 2020”, stated that future trade 
agreements should “include stronger provisions for IPR and competition, including for example 
provisions on enforcement of IP rights along the lines of the EC Enforcement Directive” (European 
Commission 2006b: 11). This EC position, however, was not mirrored by many stakeholders. A 
“[p]roposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights” (IPRED2) of July 2005 that sought to oblige MS “to consider 
all intentional infringements of an intellectual property right on a commercial scale as a criminal offense” 
(EUR-Lex 2005) drew stark opposition from other actors of the European polity. When the proposal 
reached its first debate in the EP in April 2007, Level III stakeholders such as various Non-Governmental 
Organizations and interest groups (FFII 2009a), the British Home Office (FFII 2009b), and the Dutch 
parliament voiced their critique of the far-reaching wording of the document and that the present 
proposal “falls outside the powers of the community” (Ermert 2006). With these pressures constraining 
 6
the Level II of the European political sphere, the draft was watered down from the EC version through 
amendments by EP rapporteur Nicola Zingaretti and subsequently died in the ordinary legislative 
procedure between the Council and EP because MS failed to reach consensus on the designated scope of 
its provisions (EUR-Lex 2005; FFII 2010). 
Second, also on the field of bilateral and multilateral agreements with third parties, the EC attempted and 
often succeeded to raise the standards of international IP law on various issues from the current level that 
the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 
agreements within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provide for. These raised 
standards, coined by observers as “TRIPS-plus”, include provisions such as the UPOV Convention to 
protect EU-based breeders of plant varieties, the Budapest Treaty to protect patents on microorganisms, 
or IPR protection clauses similar to IPRED, and have been “forced” (GRAIN 2003: 1) upon almost 90 
developing countries. Some observers argue this approach can aggravate the exclusion of low-income 
citizens from access to products such as generic medicines and inputs for agricultural production (Correa 
2009: 3; Said 2010: 92-98). The EC's interest to strengthen international IPR enforcement beyond TRIPS 
becomes obvious in an interview of April 21st 2009 with ACTA negotiator of the EC's DG on Trade, Luc 
Devigne, who complained that “enforcement in WTO, not to talk about WIPO, is extremely difficult”. 
He added that there was no intention to duplicate TRIPS, rather, “to go beyond it” while TRIPS shall 
represent “the floor, not the ceiling” (Ermert 2009). However, again, influential actors within the domestic 
and institutional levels of the European political arena have predominantly been opposing the 
Commission's goal to expand TRIPS. NGOs such as Intellectual Property Watch, Oxfam International, 
Déclaration de Berne, QUNO,  Third World Network, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, and Health GAP have addressed EP members and disseminated their critique of the EC's 
strategy for years (Lafortune 2006). Having picked up on these calls, a resolution passed by the EP on July 
12th 2007 with cross party support asserts that through the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
negotiations and other bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), the EU “proposes to impose 
new intellectual property "WTO+" obligations”  on the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP) and other poor developing and least developed countries. Amongst other provisions, it therefore 
calls on the Council to ”meet its commitments to the Doha Declaration and to restrict the Commission's 
mandate so as to prevent it from negotiating pharmaceutical-related TRIPS-plus provisions affecting 
public health and access to medicines, such as data exclusivity, patent extensions and limitation of grounds 
of compulsory licenses”. Further, it stresses that proposals designed to tackle the issue of counterfeiting 
should be directed at a reinforcement of existing regulatory capacity and not at “increasing levels of 
intellectual property protection” (European Parliament 2007). 
Reviewing the above stated activities and proposals on both the inner-European and international realm, it 
becomes clear that the EC has the political interest to push for a greater discussion on criminal 
enforcement of IPR infringements. As Peter Yu noted, the “European Union might have been even more 
eager than the United States to establish an international standard, due in large part to its continued 
struggle to establish a community-wide criminal enforcement directive” (Yu 2011: 984). However, it also 
becomes clear that other stakeholders on both the domestic and institutional levels within the European 





4.1.2 Conceptualizing transparency 
In order to take the focus from the Commission's political preferences to an analysis of its negotiation 
strategy during the ACTA talks, the level of transparency of these negotiations shall be scrutinized. First, a 
concept for the assessment of transparency in international treaty negotiations shall be established through 
drawing upon existing guidelines. Although a variety of observers (Malcolm 2010; Yu 2011; Levine 2011; 
Weatherhall 2011) agrees with the assertion that  “ACTA was locked inside the proverbial black box” 
(Levine 2011: 829), the Commission's very own agreement “Transatlantic Guidelines on Regulatory 
Cooperation and Transparency”, originating in the year 2002, shall serve as a neutral indicator of whether 
public concerns about the ACTA negotiations could be, as the memorandum reads, “properly understood 
and taken into account” (EU Commission 2002: 5). Under chapter five, titled “Operational Elements of 
Transparency”, the guidelines specify a total amount of 9 provisions that can be summarized in two broad 
concepts – information and interaction. First, the EC commits to “[p]rovide information about current 
and future activities to develop regulations”, to “[c]onsult with the public, including interested 
stakeholders, [...] in an early and broad manner”, to “[p]rovide timely announcement to the public about 
regulations at an early appropriate stage [...] when amendments to the regulation can still be introduced 
and public comments taken into account”, and to “[m]ake increased use of the Internet to provide access 
to documents, research, data, and analysis, and regulatory explanations”. Second, on the concept of 
interaction, the EC commits to “[i]nvite the public to submit comments on the regulation [...] and specify 
a reasonable period of time for the submission of comments” and to aid commenters by “[p]roviding a 
public explanation of the reasoning underlying the regulation” and “[i]dentifying the relevant research, 
data, and analysis relied upon by the regulators in developing the regulation and facilitating public access 
to that material”. Further, it pledges to “[r]espond in an adequate and timely manner to public questions 
and recommendations” and to “[t]ake public comments into account in the development of technical 
regulations and address them in an explanation of the reasoning underlying the final action” (European 
Commission 2002: 6). 
The concept of transparency shall be enhanced further with a deeper understanding of the negotiation 
procedures that take place in regulatory venues dealing with IPR. To begin with, the WTO with its 
administration of TRIPS is, according to observers from NGOs, arguably “the most non-transparent of 
international organizations” (Third World Network 1999). For example, the TRIPS Council generally 
refuses to offer NGOs the opportunity to either participate in, distribute documents, or hold speaking 
rights during its meetings. However, the WTO maintains a web page for access to information about the 
TRIPS Council, publishes regular reports about its ongoing activities, and shares documents that countries 
submit to organization. Furthermore, while the public can apply for permission to attend Ministerial 
meetings, NGOs and members of the press may be accredited for entry into the WTO building when 
TRIPS Council meetings take place. This gives an opportunity for stakeholders from various backgrounds 
to engage with WTO delegates first hand. Finally, the WTO receives and distributes NGO position papers 
related to its activities on the web site (Knowledge Ecology International 2009: 1-2; Malcolm 2010: 15). 
Also the WIPO provides an internet presence which disseminates meeting records, detailed minutes, lists 
of participants of its standing committees, information on stated preferences of governments and draft 
agendas. Further, access of NGOs is “fairly simple and widely used” (Knowledge Ecology International 
2009: 2), which includes the General Assembly and meetings of WIPO committees. Finally, conferences 
are also very transparent to the general public. As an observer notes, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty for example, which both touch upon IPR regulation “were 
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negotiated in a completely open meeting at the Geneva Convention Center. The public was allowed to 
attend without accreditation. The draft texts [...] were public” (Knowledge Ecology International 2009: 2). 
According to the previous analysis of the EC's own transparency guidelines on international regulatory 
negotiations and a comparison of the rules of procedure that other venues covering IPR regulation have 
adopted, it becomes clear that a satisfactory level of transparency should include both a proactive 
information policy that seeks to make documents timely enough available to the public that it is possible 
for outsiders to gain an understanding of the interests at stake and to follow the process of ongoing 
negotiations in a prompt manner. Also, domestic stakeholders whether organized or not, ought to have 
ample opportunities to state their views on the ongoing debate and be seriously acknowledged by 
negotiators for their input. 
4.1.3 Assessing the negotiation's level of transparency 
Measured against these criteria, at what level then can we assess the transparency of ACTA negotiations? 
First, on the responsibility of disseminating timely information to public stakeholders, it is suitable to put 
the date of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's initial ACTA proposal in front of the Group of 
Eight (G8) into perspective with the subsequent disclosures of negotiation texts. While the subject was 
debated for the first time at the Gleneagles G8 summit that took place in July 2005, over the course of the 
next four years, no documents regarding ACTA of any kind would reach the public eye. As leaked 
meeting notes disclose, it was only due to the lasting pressure by EP Members that a preliminary 6-page 
document summarizing “Key Elements Under Discussion” (European Commission 2009) was published 
in June 2009 (EDRI 2012). The first official draft, however, was not released until April of 2010, almost 
five years after the initial proposal and just months before the final conclusion of the whole negotiation 
process (Kaminski 2011: 5). Members of the EP, all having the right to be “immediately and fully 
informed at all stages of the [negotiation] procedure” by the EC did not receive the adequate treatment 
guaranteed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EUR-Lex 2008: C115/146). The 
first proof of this is given by the EC itself which admits that a variety of ACTA negotiation documents 
“were not accessible to ALL [sic] Members of the European Parliament”(European Commission 2012a). 
Regarding those documents that were shared, MEP Christian Engström noted, not only were the draft 
texts presented to the legislators only orally and closed from the public, but also would it “not be allowed 
to spread the information given”. Clearly, the EP Member's inability to draw upon expert advice in the 
evaluation of draft agreements represents a major caveat for a proper understanding of the issues at stake. 
As Engström continues, it is “obvious that the Commission has no intention of living up to its obligations 
under the Treaty when it comes to informing the Parliament” (Engström 2010). Overall, one can conclude 
that, apart from coordination with MS representatives, a total of five texts (the draft, the final text, and 
three publications of talking points) and oral briefings of MEPs account for the EC's official efforts to 
inform public stakeholders. 
To a considerable extent, the responsibility for the lack of public information is traceable to the EC. A 
leaked Dutch memorandum of January 2010 reporting back from the 7th ACTA negotiation round reveals 
that “Member states want that the EC pro-actively advocates transparency (amongst others publication of 
documents), but the EC is not in favour”. Fearing it to have potentially significant consequences for the 
interests of the EU, the EC stated “[i]t is not the intention that the position of the EU in those will be 
completely public”. Interestingly, also some MS delegations voiced their skepticism of increased disclosure 
and participation. As the Dutch memorandum continues, “Belgium, Portugal, Denmark and Germany are 
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still not convinced that complete transparency has to be achieved. It seemed Germany, Belgium and 
Portugal were to be persuaded, but Denmark is not very flexible” (De Winter 2010). 
Second, in terms of Level II and III actor's options to participate with their opinions in the negotiation 
procedure of ACTA, there also can be identified major limitations. Although the EC stated that NGOs 
have had repeated opportunity to engage in “stakeholder's meetings” accompanying the final four 
negotiation rounds where representatives “met and extensively debriefed NGOs, academia and 
representatives from political parties” (European Commission 2012a), reports from participants conclude 
that the meetings had been “getting less and less substantive” with negotiators "not inclined to say much," 
and criticize chaotic scheduling procedures that “appear designed to ensure that no NGOs show up” 
(American University Washington College of Law 2010a;  American University Washington College of 
Law 2010b). Interestingly, not only NGOs have seen themselves excluded from weighing into the 
negotiation process, but also potentially crucial veto players such as EP Members and MS delegations. 
Compared to the massive influence the EP has in drafting law within the ordinary legislative procedure 
(OLP) that foresees a legislative interplay between the Parliament and the Council until an agreement on a 
common language is settled, the scheduling of three plenary debates on the topic just months away from 
the finalization of the talks appears inadequate when put in perspective with the expected scope of the 
treaty. On the issue of possible criminal sanctions for IPR infringements, both MEPs and MS delegations 
made clear early on that the topic falls within the competency of MS while it was concluded that the EC 
therefore would have no mandate to deliberate it. In order to circumvent this caveat, the Commission 
consulted loosely behind closed doors with a so-called “Article 133 Committee” consisting of trade 
experts from each member state who are appointed by the Council (European Council 2009). Leaked 
statements from national officials shows that this conduct was not seen as a sufficient participation of MS 
in the negotiation process. Italian delegate to WIPO Mauro Masi noted a significant gap between the 
views of the EC and those of several MS on the way how ACTA competencies should be allocated and 
stated that "there is a problem" between those entities "that will take time to work out” (Wikileaks 2011a). 
Fabrizio Mazza, head of the Intellectual Property Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that MS 
are opposed to the EC negotiating matters related to criminal enforcement and that the level of 
confidentiality in the ACTA negotiations has been “set at a higher level than is customary for non-security 
agreements”.  According to Mazza, it is impossible for MS to conduct necessary consultations with IPR 
stakeholders and legislatures under this level of confidentiality (Wikileaks 2011b). This assertion is 
mirrored by a recently declassified EU Justice and Home Affairs Counsellor's meeting record which 
proves that various MS such as Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and 
Luxembourg deplored that there has been “no opportunity for the national experts to examine [ACTA 
drafts] in depth”. They further condemned that relevant documents had an extraordinarily high 
classification level and thus “were not easily accessible to the delegations, who consequently were notified 
those documents very late and were not able to prepare themselves at time for the meetings” (European 
Council 2011). 
Compared with the rules of procedures at other venues of IPR regulation (see above), it becomes clear 
that the level of transparency of the ACTA negotiations was unusual for a regulatory endeavor of such a 
magnitude. Stefan Johansson, representing the EU Council Presidency of Sweden during the ACTA 
negotiations in the second half of 2009 agreed in a leaked statement that “[i]f the instrument for example 
had been negotiated within the World Intellectual Property Organization [...], WIPO's Secretariat would 
have made public initial draft proposals” (Wikileaks 2011d). An analysis of examples from the WTO such 
as the 2001 Doha Declaration negotiations on TRIPS and Public Health shows that its procedures are 
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“relatively transparent, when compared to ACTA” (Keionline 2009). Finally, Jeremy Malcolm concludes 
after a thorough comparison between the processes at two venues of IPR regulation (the WTO and 
WIPO) and three other venues of international negotiations such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the one hand and the procedures at ACTA negotiations on 
the other that the latter “fails to comply with the basic norms and best practices of transparency and 
participation that have been established by other institutions in the intellectual property policy regime” 
(Malcolm 2010: 23). 
4.1.4 The track record of the Commission 
After having established that the comparatively low level of transparency of the ACTA negotiations and 
the resulting minimized constraint by Level II and Level III stakeholders on the course of deliberations, 
the question remains whether this increases the amount of gains available to EU negotiators at the 
international level. Put into perspective with the previously established interests of EC policymakers to 
achieve an IPR enforcement agreement which is more potent than existing regulatory regimes, and to 
envisage its implementation along a broad spectrum of both EU and non-EU nations, the final version of 
the treaty appears to come close to these goals. The most crucial of the provisions are laid out in ACTA 
Chapter II “Legal Framework For Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights” which begins with 
stipulating that each party shall make civil judicial or administrative procedures concerning the 
enforcement of IPR infringement available (European Commission 2011: Article 6). The section “Civil 
Enforcement” provides judges with the ability "to issue an order against a party to desist from an 
infringement" (Id.: Article 8), require pirated copyright goods and counterfeit trademark goods to be 
destroyed (Id.: Article 10), ask (alleged) infringers to provide information on the goods it controls (Id.: 
Article 11), and order anyone who “knowingly or with reasonable grounds to know” engaged in infringing 
activity to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has 
suffered as a result of the infringement (Id.: Article 9). Furthermore, judicial authorities shall become 
vested with the ability to order measures against a third party over whom the authority exercises 
jurisdiction in order to not only prevent an IPR infringement from occurring, but also “entering into the 
channels of commerce” (Id.: Article 12). At border controls of both destination and in-transit countries, 
authorities become vested with the ability to act on suspect goods and commercial shipments of any size 
on their own initiative or upon request of a rights holder and "goods of a non-commercial nature 
contained in travelers’ personal luggage" (Id.: Article 14). The treaty section on criminal enforcement 
provides that each party shall make criminal procedures and penalties directed at IPR infringement 
available, targeting activities such as unauthorized copying of cinematographic works. The envisaged 
penalties for such offenses should "include imprisonment as well as monetary fines", which are to be set 
high enough for a discouragement of future actions forbidden under the treaty  (Id.: Article 23). Finally, 
the section on enforcement of “Intellectual Property Rights in the Digital Environment” demands the 
creation of enforcement measures targeting any IPR infringement “which takes place in the digital 
environment”, specifically highlighting the circumvention of Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
protections (Id.: Article 27). In combination with Article 23(4), requiring criminal liability for aiding and 
abetting of IPR infringements to be established as criminal offenses, this “may expand secondary liability 
of Internet intermediaries, consumer device manufactures and software developers” (Liu 2012: 6). 
Interestingly, Chapter V “Institutional Arrangements” additionally provide that an ACTA committee is to 
be constituted as governing body of the treaty in which all signatories are represented. The responsibilities 
of the body include, but are not limited to, monitoring of implementation, proposal of changes to the 
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convention, and admittance of WTO-members which were not present at the negotiation stage (Id.: 
Article 36). 
Of all of the above, especially striking are three provisions for that they clearly exceed the conventions 
settled in competing IPR regulatory regimes. First, the adoption of third-party enforcement clearly goes 
beyond the TRIPS protocol (or could be termed "TRIPS-plus”), because no comparable provisions 
address rules for established violations and provisional measures for threatened infringements. TRIPS 
Article 44 does provide that members are not obligated to allow for injunctions against persons who 
acquire or order protected goods without having known or having had reason to know that they were 
dealing in infringing products. Article 50 permits provisional measures to prevent the infringement of IP 
rights and to prevent the entry of infringing products, but like Article 44, it does not directly address 
enforcement against third parties. The necessity of having personal and territorial jurisdiction over a third 
party, however, can be found in the final version of ACTA (Baker 2011: 586f). Second, ACTA makes use 
of the phrase of "entering into the channels of commerce" (European Commission 2011: Article 8). 
Although the TRIPS agreement originally had included the channels of commerce provision in its chapter 
on enforcement, the concept was subsequently clarified considerably by limiting if to goods that had 
entered commercial channels within the territory of the enforcing country. By now extending this concept 
beyond such territory, as Brook Baker holds, “ACTA is not only TRIPS-plus, but it also introduces 
substantial ambiguity about the length, depth, and width of the channels of commerce” (Baker 2011: 587). 
Third, although a comparison of leaked negotiation texts links to a gradual weakening of provisions 
regarding the liability of internet service providers (ISP) for actions taken by their costumers, significant 
language permitting such an interpretation of the treaty remained in the final text, prompting many agents 
of internet freedom to argue it would establish unseen possibilities for officials to “regulate the internet” 
(Martin 2012). Fourth, the EC's draft of IPRED2 sought to criminalize any copyright infringement "on a 
commercial scale", which was one of the reasons why the project was halted over the course of the OLP. 
In ACTA's final text, however, it is stated that any infringement carried out “as a commercial activity” falls 
within the provision, which even widens the already controversial phrasing of EC's earlier IPRED2 
proposal (Weatherhall 2011: 869-870). 
Putting these provisions into perspective, there are three broad conclusions to draw. First, as Fabrizio 
Mazza who was in charge of ACTA at the Italian ministry of Foreign Affairs confessed,  “ACTA is a de 
facto 'TRIPS Plus' in the view of many European nations” (Wikileaks 2011c). Second, the Level I 
agreement on the criminal chapter of ACTA shows striking similarities to IPRED2, but circumvented the 
legislative competences that the European Parliament was granted through the adoption of the ToL (FFII 
2010). Third, the indefinite and ambiguous wording used in many provisions of the final version of the 
treaty can be understood as an application of “strategic ambiguity” (Governance Across Broders 2012) 
that seeks to pave the way for a continuous “ratcheting up” (Weatherhall 2011: 858) of IP standards. In 
fact, as of September 2012, the EC put forward a proposal for a revision of IPRED2 that is directed more 
specifically on the “fight” against IPR infringement in the “on-line environment” than the previous 
proposal of the regulation. Interestingly, with plans of more nuanced provision on issues such as the 
liability of intermediaries and a clearer definition of “commercial scale”, the new proposal builds upon 
vague specifications put forward in ACTA (EU Commission 2012b; Prantl 2012). 
4.1.5 Intermediate conclusion 
Chapter 4.1 dealt with the question how the level of transparency of international treaty negotiations 
affects the success of EU negotiators. In the first place, it could be shown that the EC followed political 
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goals that were independent from Level II and Level III stakeholders. However, instead of trying to 
persuade potential veto players through an open political process and make a high level of transparency a 
conditio sine qua non over the course of the negotiations, the EC appears to have followed the same logic 
as US Trade Representative Ambassador Ron Kirk who feared that negotiation parties would start 
“walking away from the table“ should the texts become public too early (Knowledge Ecology 
International 2009). Therefore, the EC also chose not to publicize or even actively concealed the far-
reaching provisions of the draft treaty from the European public. In order to achieve that, the talks were 
cloaked behind the invention of ACTA as a new plurilateral regulatory regime, while existing forums such 
as the TRIPS council or WIPO have been entirely ignored. What stands at the end of this artificial 
expansion of the EU representative's negotiation win-set is a treaty text that includes a variety of 
provisions that were not acceptable to a majority of stakeholder and institutional veto players at Levels II 
and III, but come closer to EC political preferences than otherwise possible. It was hypothesized above 
that a low level of transparency increases the amount of gains available to EU negotiators at the 
international level. According to the previous analysis, hypothesis 1 has to be judged as validated. 
4.2 Confronted with reality: ACTA facing ratification at the domestic stage 
4.2.1 European legal provisions on international treaty ratification 
Moving from the international stage of treaty negotiation at Level I to the non-international levels, it is 
should be recalled that the size of the actual win-set depends on Level II and III political institutions, 
especially considering ratification processes, veto players, and the independence of central decision makers 
from their constituents. In terms of veto players that possibly emerge from certain constitutional rules of 
procedure on treaty ratifications, both of the non-international levels of the three-level game potentially 
might be of interest. First, considering individual member states, the question whether or not level III 
legislators may have a say in an international ratification depends on the issue at stake. While Article 3, 
Clause 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) holds that the supranational level shall have 
“exclusive competence” in policy areas such as competition, fisheries, and commerce, Clause 2 posits that 
the Union “shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when 
its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union” (EUR-Lex 2008: C83/51). Here, the 
question to what extent the ACTA agreement goes beyond the current EU legislative catalog (“acquis 
communautaire”) is crucial. If it transcends the agreed scope of the Community's law, its conclusion can 
not be achieved solely in the political arena of level II. Although the representatives of the European 
Commission repeatedly stated publicly during the ACTA negotiations that their envisioned provisions for 
the final version of the treaty would not require changes of the acquis (De Gucht 2012), various observers 
have challenged this assertion. One of the most informed discussions of this question was publicized by 
seven leading European scholars of IP law and signed by more than 180 senior academics and concluded 
that “[c]ontrary to the European Commission's repeated statements [...], certain ACTA provisions are not 
entirely compatible with EU law and will directly or indirectly require additional action” (Metzger 2011).  
A study, requested by the EP Committee on International Trade (INTA), summed up that “in some cases, 
ACTA is arguably more ambitious than EU law, providing a degree of protection that appears to go 
beyond the limits established in EU law” (European Parliament 2011). In light of these analyses, the EC 
agreed that the text “contains a number of provisions on criminal enforcement that fall […] under the 
area of shared competences” and thus decided ACTA to “be signed and concluded both by the EU and 
by all the Member States” (European Commission 2011b: 2). 
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Second, considering the level of the EU supranational polity, the ratification procedure for international 
agreements was altered significantly with the adoption of the ToL, which is in effect since December 1st 
2009. Through an amendment of former Article 300 of the Treaty of Rome, the resulting Article 218 
TFEU provides that the EU Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision concluding 
the agreement after obtaining the consent in the case of “agreements covering fields to which either the 
ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the European 
Parliament is required” (EUR-Lex 2008: C83/145). Since the ToL also provides that OLP shall apply in 
the whole spectrum of Common Commercial Policy, the EP since recently has to give its consent to all 
trade agreements, including ACTA. It does not, however, have the possibility to propose amendments to 
the draft Treaty and can only approve or reject the whole agreement on a “take it or leave it basis” (Pollet-
Fort 2010: 11). As a consequence, this makes clear that the opinion of the EP will be necessary in the 
conclusion of trade agreements. Although it is formally still the Council that mandates the EC to negotiate 
on behalf of the Union, commentators conclude that through the procedural change originating in the 
ToL, the Parliament's opinion may have to be taken into account even before the initiation of any future 
trade negotiations. To avoid a “blocking [of] the whole agreement at the conclusion stage”, it will be 
essential “to ensure that the EP is well aware of the content of the agreement and that its majority backs 
the whole content” (Pollet-Fort 2010: 11). 
4.2.2 ACTA caught in crossfire between domestic coalitions 
4.2.2.1 Media coverage 
As established in chapter 4.1.3, the ACTA negotiations of 2005-2010 were conducted under a low level of 
transparency. However, in the time of ubiquitous information that is available through the internet to 
more than 70 percent of EU citizens (Eurostat 2010), official channels are not the only sources from 
which the public can draw its conclusions about the content and status of a debated draft treaty. Since 
both the interest from level III stakeholders in the content of the draft was unusually high and the parties 
involved in the negotiations were numerous, it is not surprising that several leaks of varying gravity 
occurred that made numerous negotiation documents available in the internet. The first leak occurred on 
May 22nd 2008 on the website Wikileaks and revealed the 2007 “Discussion Paper on a Possible Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement” summarizing key points of discussion (Wikileaks 2008). Between 
negotiation rounds four to seven over the course of the year 2009, several leaks revealed the status of 
negotiations on specific issues such as criminal enforcement proposals, border measures, and ISP liability 
(Geist 2009a; Wikileaks 2009; Geist 2009b). On March 23rd 2010, little more than six months before the 
conclusion of the negotiations, the first full draft (dated January 18th 2010) appeared ready to download 
(La Quadrature du Net 2010) and was followed by leaks of the July 1st 2010, August 25th 2010, and 
October 2nd 2010 versions (La Quadrature du Net 2012a). 
Several other domestic actors such as online news outlets, pressure groups and private bloggers have 
quickly picked up on the spreading information about ACTA and its possible scope. With the websites of 
law professor at the University of Ottawa Michael Geist and the internet freedom advocacy groups “La 
Quadrature du Net”, “Knowledge Ecology International”, and “Iptegrity.com” being one of the few 
outlets that offered from very early on a well-informed, rather nuanced and sober coverage of the ACTA's 
state of negotiations, a multitude of blogs, online videos and forum entries engaged in dramatic and 
sometimes exaggerated warnings that the introduction of ACTA would bring an “end to the internet as we 
know it” (Digi10ve 2012). A telling example is the comment from a blogger who claimed that ACTA's 
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“censorship provisions are [...] extremely troubling” and added that they “introduce virtual fiefdoms for 
copyright holders, encouraging a chilling effect on freedom of expression online” (Harvey 2012). The 
advocacy group “Article 19” held that “[t]he ACTA enforcement regime imposes a nineteenth century 
view of intellectual property”, disproportionately protects the IP interests of the private sector “at the 
expense of individuals’ rights to freedom of expression and information” and finds the ACTA 
“encouraging governments and private parties to engage in large-scale surveillance of the internet”. If 
enacted by the EU, the text continues, “ACTA will undermine online freedom and stifle creativity and 
innovation” (Article 19 2012). Finally, the writer for an Australian newspaper was confident that “[t]he 
ACTA draft is a scary document”. If a treaty based on its provisions were adopted, it would consequently 
“enable any border guard, in any treaty country, to check any electronic device for any content that they 
suspect infringes copyright laws. They need no proof, only suspicion. They would be able to seize any 
device […] and confiscate it or destroy anything on it, merely on suspicion. On the spot, no lawyers, no 
right of appeal, no nothing” (Philipson 2008). Just as leaked documents spurred both weighted analysis 
and biased comments throughout the internet and offline media, the amount of citizens concerned with 
the previously unknown trade agreement grew steadily. Accordingly, an organizer of German-wide 
protests against ACTA reveals within correspondence with the author that he learned about the issue 
through the “admittedly populist and dramatizing video made by the group Anonymous”1. This video of 
more than seven minutes length, narrated in German language, and uploaded in January 2012, features a 
detailed, yet polemic explanation of ACTA's contents and its possible effects and has been viewed more 
than 3.4 million times as of September 2012 (Youtube 2012). The risen interest of the public also can be 
tracked through a frequency analysis of the search term “ACTA” in an internet search machine. The graph 
below, constructed by the author using data from the database “Google Trends”, depicts the popularity of 
the query in Germany (red color), France (blue color) and Poland (green color) between January 2009 and 
September 2012 (following the y-axis) and the term's peak popularity being set as 100 percent (along the 
x-axis). 
 
This massive spur of interest coincided with a ceremony that was held on October 1st 2011 in Tokyo, 
where the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea 
signed the ACTA treaty. The adoption of ACTA through the EU Council during a meeting on agriculture 
and fisheries in mid-December 2011 (European Council 2011) and another ceremony celebrating the 
signature of the EU and 22 of its member states on January 26th 2012 contributed further not only to the 
publicity of the project, but also to critique's conviction that it was “high time” to rally for an halt of the 
ratification procedure (Tanithblog 2012).  
                                                 
1 Correspondence with the author, 09/23/2012. Translated by the author. Original statement: "Ich bin auf das 
Thema ACTA erst durch das - man muss es so sagen - populistische und auch zu stark dramatisierende Video von 
Anonymous aufmerksam geworden. “ 
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4.2.2.2 Citizen Petitions 
With the orderly ratification of ACTA looming, its domestic opponents went from mere debate and 
information on the issue to more active forms of opposition. These include the introduction and 
advertisement of petitions against the treaty, the hacking of government websites, and calls to street 
protests. In terms of the first activity, there have been several petitions directed at the legislative bodies of 
both MS and the EU. A petition to the German Bundestag by citizen Herbert Bredthauer, who indicated 
as his motivation “to make the people aware to be attentive when something like that [the ACTA] gets 
passed without the consent of the society” received 55.000 signatures forcing a Bundestag committee to 
debate the petition in an open meeting (Tagesschau 2012). Most notably, a petition against the ratification 
of ACTA through the EU Parliament on the online activism portal “Avaaz” garnered more than 2.8 
million signatories between its start on January 25th 2012 and September 2012 (Avaaz 2012). More 
directly, the EP committee on Petitions was confronted with five different petitions calling for a halt of 
the ACTA ratification and debated these public inputs thoroughly in a meeting in June 2012 (European 
Parliament 2012b). 
4.2.2.3 Activities of Hacker groups 
More extremist opponents of ACTA engaged in the illegal hacking of governmental websites in order to 
make their case more prominent. Just two days before the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was to sign 
the text during a ceremony in Tokyo on January 26th 2012, a hacker group called “Anonymous Poland” 
targeted several websites of the executive and legislative branches with denial-of-service attacks and 
threatened to publicize hacked private data concerning Members of the Sejm, should the ACTA 
ratification not be stopped (Mattern 2012). Also in the Czech Republic, hackers got themselves access to 
private information about all members of the ruling Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and leaked it to Czech 
newspapers (Heise Online 2012). In the same way, the websites of the European Parliament and several 
Slovenian parties were rendered inaccessible on January 27th 2012 and 13th of February 2012, respectively 
(EU Infothek 2012; Futurezone 2012). 
4.2.2.4 Street protest 
Finally, throughout many blogs, but especially within social media networks, public street protests against 
ACTA were advertised. As annex 1 shows, only the calls for protests in Germany on February 11th 2012 
which were spread through the social media platform facebook.com already covered more than 48 
different cities and drew a total of almost 100.000 users who announced their participation. Similar large-
scale online invitations for urban protests against ACTA were coordinated in various other European 
nations (Netzwelt 2012). The coordinated effort through social media invitations to events and advertising 
on blogs and other websites resulted in remarkable amounts of both protest events themselves and 
citizens attending these gatherings. With Poland being the first country where mass protests with 
thousands of participants came to happen on January 25th 2012, observers have termed this the “greatest 
citizen movement since the Solidarność's founding in 1980” (Vexr 2012). On February 11th 2012, 
however, these protests were arranged to take place in hundreds of European cities under the headline 
“ACTA ad acta” (Tagesschau 2012) and drew hundreds of thousands of participants (Le Blond 2012). As 
the graphic below crafted by the blog “stopacta.de” depicts, these protests were actually spread 




Furthermore, subsequent coordinated Europe-wide rallies have taken place on February 25th 2012 and 
June 6th 2012, drawing again thousands of protesters throughout the subcontinent (Stopacta.de 2012b; 
Stopacta.de 2012c) 
4.2.2.5 The level of transparency as driving force of opposition 
While the outcry taking place throughout the internet and on the streets of European cities was termed by 
EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht as a “Europe-wide debate on ACTA”, dominated by 
“disinformation on social media and blogs” (La Quadrature du Net 2012b), however, academic comments 
mostly hint at the EC's mistakes in its communication strategy during the negotiations when seeking to 
identify the main reason for the escalation of the public debate on ACTA. As Peter Yu holds, the applied 
“'cloak of secrecy' initially insulated ACTA negotiators from external pressure and outside criticism”, but 
“eventually backfired on them by fueling concerns, fears, rumors, allegations, speculations, and paranoia 
and by distracting them from focusing on substantive discussions” (Yu 2011: 999). In the same way David 
Levine argues that the low level of transparency that was upheld during the talks “has mutated what would 
otherwise have been a largely public debate about ACTA's merits and terms info a hearsay-laden, 
speculative melee” (Levien 2011: 825). Also public officials from negotiation parties have understood that 
the EC's negotiation strategy could eventually backfire. A leaked document shows that Stefan Johansson, 
who has represented the EU at the ACTA negotiations during the Swedish EU Presidency complained 
“that the secrecy issue has been very damaging to the negotiating climate in Sweden. All political parties 
have vocal minorities challenging the steps the government has taken to step up its IPR enforcement. For 
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those groups, the refusal to make ACTA documents public has been an excellent political tool around 
which to build speculation about the political intent behind the negotiations. [...] [T]he secrecy around the 
negotiations has led to that the legitimacy of the whole process being questioned” (Wikileaks 2011d). On 
the matter of trust, two important dynamics are interesting. First, the public suspicion that the ACTA 
treaty was driven by lobbyists who took control of the EC in order to dictate their agenda on legislators 
was reinforced by the low level of transparency. The fact that the Head of Unit to deal with copyright and 
enforcement issues on behalf of the EC, Maria Martin-Prat, previously worked for the record industry’s 
lobby organization IFPI, where she directed its global legal policy (Engström 2011), was furthermore not 
conducive to the credibility of the EC as “honest broker”. Second, not only has the low level of 
transparency itself raised suspicions and provoked opposition against ACTA, but also did it deprive the 
EC from the ability conduct a thorough information campaign that would seek to tackle the reservations 
and anxieties of the public. Especially the great amount of vague provisions that the final version of the 
treaty contains makes it important to set trustworthy additional boundaries to these provisions in the 
aftermath of negotiations. However, the secrecy of the negotiations left the job of interpreting and 
communicating the significance of the leaked document's content to online activists and made it 
impossible to counterbalance effectively the unfavorable image that ACTA gained along the majority of 
European societies. Publications such as the January 2012 “10 myths about ACTA” (European 
Commission 2012c) within which the EC tried to counter the most popular reservations against the treaty 
came too late, were undermined in their effect through lasting suspicions regarding the EC's 
trustworthiness, and thus did not gain traction (FFII 2012). 
Finally, even discounting for the spread of exaggerated or wrong statements about ACTA, also the actual 
scope of the agreement has contributed to the public outcry against it. As reflected by the repeated 
decisions of the EP to reject the EC's endeavors to strengthen the criminalization and enforcement 
provisions of IPR regulation, and the unique European level of sensitivity in terms of freedom of speech 
and the public right to (data) privacy, it could have become clear to the negotiators that the scope of the 
ACTA agreement might find itself outside of the level III winset. However, in the same way that 
information for the public about the status of negotiations was scarce, so was information for the EC on 
the actual attitudes of the people vis à vis the treaty's concrete provisions. 
Correspondence of the author with several organizers of protests and hosts of websites opposing ACTA 
confirms these assumptions. Asked for his main point of interest in ACTA, one of the international 
coordinators of the February 11th 2012 “ACTA ad acta” protests in Berlin highlights that “the problem 
with the treaty was, beneath the unavailability of information for the public, the vague formulation of 
Articles. […]  Therefore, there was the danger of room for interpretation”2 On the estimated interest of 
the EC to negotiate ACTA with a low level of transparency, he added “it was only about enforcement and 
strengthening of traditional structures, because traditional stakeholders earn money with it. An adaption of 
IPR […] to the 21st century fails due to struggle for power and structures. Lobbies were to be served – but 
                                                 
2 Correspondence with the author, 09/11/2012. Translated by the author. Original question: "Gegenüber welchen 
Inhalten von ACTA haben/hätten Sie persönlich (oder die Organisation, für die Sie eintreten) sich informiert/sich 
informieren wollen bzw. haben Einfluss ausgeübt/hätten Einfluss ausüben wollen? Gab es Ihrer Meinung nach auch 
in der finalen Version Änderungsbedarf?" Original answer: "Das Problem mit dem Vertragswerk war neben der 
"Nicht"-Verfügbarkeit für die Öffentlichkeit die schwammige Formulierung von Pharagraphen. Grundsätzlich wäre 
ein solches Vertragswerk in Deutschland gar nicht notwendig, da alle relevanten Punkte bereits gesetzlich bei uns 
geregelt sind. Daher bestand die Gefahr in der neuerlichen Interpretationsmöglichkeit, die sich durch die ungenauen 
Formulierungen eröffnete. Dies hätte gesetzlichen Neuregelungen, gedeckelt durch eine EU Vorgabe, Tür und Tor 
geöffnet und diese Neuregelungen wären nicht im Interesse des Verbrauchers gewesen. Stichpunkt: Möglichkeit der 
Providerüberwachung." 
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the citizen had got wind of it”3. A member of the German “Chaos Computer Club” who helped 
organizing one of the biggest protest events taking place in Hamburg on February 11th 2012 suspected 
that “the EU Commission – under the influence of lobby groups […] had the goal to establish a treaty 
which should become the framework for future legislation”4. 
4.2.3 The reaction of political actors at the Member State level 
As established previously, the size of the win-set depends on Level II and III political institutions, 
especially considering ratification procedures, possible veto players, and the independence of central 
decision makers from their constituents. Since it could be made clear that ratification procedures rendered 
both the national level III and the supranational level II to possible veto players in the ACTA ratification 
procedure, and the attitude of the (vocal) majority of MS citizens opposed the treaty's adoption, the 
remaining variable is the independence of decision-makers from the will of their constituents. Although it 
has to be conceded that the majority of domestic political actors within the European Union saw the 
ACTA as favorable, in the same clarity it can be shown how fast the attitudes of policymakers changed 
after the start of coordinated online and offline protest activities. In the case of Poland, for example, 
especially the hacking of governmental websites seems to have had a major impact. While Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk still defended the agreement on January 24th 2012 (Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2012), 
on February 3rd 2012, he announced that “his government had made insufficient consultations before 
signing the agreement in late January, and it was necessary to ensure it was entirely safe for Polish citizens” 
(ZDNet 2012). Two weeks later, Tusk even “regretted” his previous stance on the agreement, said it was 
wrong to hold on to a mistake, and claimed that the arguments have “persuaded” him (ORF 2012). 
Another telling example of a sudden turn of political ideology can be witnessed through the statement of 
Helena Drnovšek Zorko, Slovenian ambassador to Japan, who signed ACTA on behalf of the Slovenian 
government. In a fairly personal and non-political statement, she told that “[e]very day there is a barrage 
of questions in my inbox and on Facebook from mostly kind and somewhat baffled people, who cannot 
understand how it occurred to me to sign an agreement so damaging to the state and citizens”. She 
explained that she “signed ACTA out of civic carelessness” and blamed herself that she “did not clearly 
connect the agreement I had been instructed to sign with the agreement that, according to my own civic 
conviction, limits and withholds the freedom of engagement on the largest and most significant network 
in human history” (Metina Lista 2012). Finally, German Minister of Justice Sabine Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger was also one of the proponents of a rapid ratification of the ACTA agreement. However, 
explaining that “whenever we see that there are many people in Europe who do not want ACTA, then it is 
                                                 
3 Correspondence with the author, 09/11/2012. Translated by the author. Original question: "Welches Interesse, 
glauben Sie persönlich (oder die Organisation, für die Sie eintreten), hatte die EU-Kommission, ACTA in der Art 
und Weise zu verhandeln wie sie es tat?" Original answer: "Die Gründe liegen völlig auf der Hand - es ging hier 
lediglich um die Durchsetzung und Zementierung von altbackenen Strukturen, weil ebenso altbackene Herrschaften 
Geld damit verdienen. Eine Anpassung des Urheberrechts sowie der Patentregelung an das 21. Jahrhundert, unser 
Informationszeitalter, ist längst überfällig, es scheitert aber an Kompetenzgehabe und Machtstrukturen. Hier sollten 
Lobbies bedient werden - nur hat der gemeine Bürger Wind davon bekommen und einen Aufstand angezettelt." 
4 Correspondence with the author, 09/10/2012. Translated by the author. Original question: Welches Interesse, 
glauben Sie persönlich (oder die Organisation, für die Sie eintreten), hatte die EU-Kommission, ACTA in der Art 
und Weise zu verhandeln wie sie es tat?" Original answer: "Ich bin mir sicher, dass die EU-Kommission - unter dem 
offensichtlichen Einfluss von verschiedenen Lobbygruppen, insbesondere aus der Pharmabranche, der 
Markengueterindustrie und der Contentindustrie - das Ziel hatte einen Vertrag zu etablieren der dann wieder die 
Grundlage fuer eine Gesetzgebung in den Vertragsstaaten war.  Auch wenn in vielen Bereichen des Vertrages man 
den Eindruck hatte das die beteiligten Politiker nicht wirklich gesehen haben - oder sehen wollten – welche 
Konsequenzen dieser Vertrag im Detail hatte war ihnen klar das ein solche Gesetzgebung eine kontroverse 
Diskussion ausgeloest haette was wiederum deutlichen Widerstand gegeben hätte." 
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right to take these protests seriously and say: we do not carry this project forward for the moment” 
(Beckedahl 2012). 
Although not all European domestic politicians followed the same logic of switching positions on the 
topic vis à vis public protests, these examples give an indication of why the signature and ratification 
procedures of Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Austria were put on halt within only a matter of several weeks (Mason 2012). It becomes 
clear that an international agreement negotiated by the European Union that at the same time requires 
consent from MS governments is especially prone to the influence of level III public stakeholders. The 
EC's decision to withhold crucial information on the progress of negotiations not only from citizens, but 
also in some cases from MS delegations therefore cannot be highlighted enough as factor that may have 
led to the break-up of the issue-specific political alliance between the EC and national governments that 
was formed on behalf of ACTA. 
4.2.4 The reaction of political actors at the Community level 
However, as established previously, not only level III public stakeholders and related veto players on the 
domestic stage are to be considered, but also the ones at the supranational European stage. While the 
European Council, as noted above, quickly and discretely executed its part of the ACTA ratification,   the 
EP, vested with new post-Lisbon powers, demanded its say. The estrangement of the EP's stance on the 
issue of ACTA from the one of the Commission, however, started already way earlier than the protests by 
the European public. Already in 2008, when it became clear that the EC would fail to provide a level of 
transparency and participation to the service of the MEPs, the EP adopted a resolution condemning the 
secretive approach taken by the EC while threatening to take the issue to the European Court of Justice. 
The resolution, which was adopted with the clear majority of 633 to 13 votes, the Parliament 
“[e]xpresse[d] its concern over the lack of a transparent process in the conduct of the ACTA 
negotiations”. Further, it “[c]all[ed] on the Commission and the Council to grant public and parliamentary 
access to ACTA negotiation texts and summaries” and “[d]eplore[d] the calculated choice of the parties 
not to negotiate through well-established international bodies, such as WIPO and WTO, which have 
established frameworks for public information and consultation”. Finally, the EP clarified the EC's 
negotiation mandate highlighting that ACTA should only concentrate “on IPR enforcement measures and 
not on substantive IPR issues such as the scope of protection, limitations and exceptions, secondary 
liability or liability of intermediaries” and appealed that it is “not used as a vehicle for modifying the 
existing European IPR enforcement framework“ (European Parliament 2008). 
Representing both an example of the EC's failure to comply with the EP's demands in terms of 
transparency and as a symbol of the rift between the two supranational institutions, the EP chief 
rapporteur on the ACTA agreement, Kader Arif, stepped down from his post on January 27th 2012. Arif 
commented his decision with stressing that ”I condemn the whole process which led to the signature of 
this agreement: no consultation of the civil society, lack of transparency since the beginning of 
negotiations, repeated delays of the signature of the text without any explanation given, reject of 
Parliament's recommendations as given in several resolutions of our assembly. […] However, everything is 
made to prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. I want to send a strong signal 
and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable situation. I will not take part in this masquerade” 
(BBC 2012). As shown in the Chapter covering the EC's track record as a negotiator at the international 
level, this lack of parliamentary inclusion resulted in the agreement on provisions that were clearly beyond 
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the EP's consensus on IPR regulation that was publicly known latest since its rejection of the 
Commission's proposal on IPRED2 in 2007.  
Consequently, whenever EP decisions regarding ACTA were due, they usually had one result. On May 
31st 2012, three Committees concerned with the issue – ITRE (Industry, Research and Energy), JURI 
(Legal Affairs), and LIBE (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs) all agreed to recommend the plenary 
to reject ACTA. On June 4th 2012, the DEVE (Development) committee followed suit, while on June 
21st 2012, also the main Committee in terms the treaty content, INTA (International Trade), voted on the 
report containing the recommendation to reject ACTA by a majority of 19 to 12. Finally, the assembly of 
the European Parliament decided on July 4th 2012 to reject the ratification of ACTA by a margin of 478 
Nayes, 39 Yays, and 165 abstentions (Votewatch 2012). As the Social Democrats group of the EP 
concluded in a published statement commenting the vote, “[f]or the first time the Parliament has used the 
powers granted by the Lisbon Treaty to reject an international trade agreement. The Commission and the 
Council will now be aware that they cannot override the Parliament, which represents and defends 
citizens. […] We regret that the EPP has consistently disregarded people's concerns and Parliament's 
advice on ACTA's threat to fundamental rights. They tried to bring secrecy and delay to this vote until the 
very last minute. Fortunately we put together a big majority to defeat their call” (S&D 2012). 
4.2.5 Intermediate conclusion 
The previous analysis makes clear that the way how some European policymakers such as the Italian 
Deputy Director for Economic Affairs Minister, Massimo Spinetti, saw ACTA “as a tool like-minded 
countries could use” to advance the IPR agenda “dynamically and with fewer political difficulties than 
high-standards countries would encounter at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), or even 
the G-8” (Wikileaks 2011e), did not meet the actual reality. It could be shown that in times of abundant 
information available on the internet, whatever the level of secrecy advanced for the purpose of an 
international treaty negotiation with European involvement, provided the existence of a public interest, a 
certain amount of content is very likely to become public. The dilemma for a representative who 
negotiates in secrecy is therefore that he is very unlikely to take advantage of the merits of a completely 
insular deliberation environment, but at the same time is very likely cut from level III and level II 
feedback, since there are only few official channels granting access of outsider's opinions to reach the 
delegation. The result can be an international agreement such as ACTA that finds itself outside of the 
domestic or supranational win-sets, with involuntary defection as the consequence. Finally, a low level of 
transparency obviously  contributes itself massively to a suspicious attitude of both the general public, but 
also professional policymakers. This dynamic additionally narrows down the actual size of the win-set and 
thus decreases the likelihood of ratification. Since it was hypothesized previously that a low level of 
transparency of international treaty negotiations decreases the likelihood of ratification at the non-
international level, according to these findings, hypothesis 2 has to be judged as validated. 
5. Conclusion 
Observing a discrepancy between the EC's commitments to a transparent conduct of negotiations when it 
acts as a representative on behalf of the EU and shortcomings in the fulfillment of these commitments, 
the present study tried to investigate on the dynamics between the ability of EU negotiators to achieve 
their goals and the level of transparency these talks are conducted in. Asking specifically “how does the 
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level of transparency of international treaty negotiations affect the success of EU negotiators?”, the 
present framework of analysis was drawn from a slightly alternated version of Robert Putnam's two-level 
game approach and led to the establishment of two hypothesis. First, a low level of transparency of 
international treaty negotiations increases the amount of gains available to EU negotiators at the 
international level. Second, a low level of transparency of international treaty negotiations decreases the 
likelihood of ratification at the non-international level. These hypothesis were tested against the case of 
the international ACTA negotiations and the following ratification procedure which all took place 
between the years 2005 and 2012. 
In terms of the first hypothesis, it could be shown that the EC's interest within the talks deviated from the 
ones of domestic and European-level stakeholders. Further, it was found that the EC actively engaged in a 
strategy of low transparency in order decouple its activities at the international negotiation level from the 
constraining effects of these stakeholders in order to achieve greater outcomes until the closure of the 
agreement. Since the EC was successful with this strategy, hypothesis 1 was acknowledged as verified. In 
terms of the second hypothesis, it could be shown that this strategy was not efficient to such an extent 
that the debated issue could be avoided from the public agenda. Rather, the secrecy resulted in a fair 
amount of interest for the language of the agreement and its consequences. Combined with the activation 
of domestic stakeholders through modern channels of communication such as blogs and social networks, 
the low level of transparency left negotiators with the “worst of both worlds” struggling to defend an 
agreement that nobody ought to talk about while opponents were radicalized by the EC's methods. 
Furthermore, it became clear that regardless of the possible advantages a low level of transparency may 
have in the initial stage of an international negotiation process, the occurrence that the preliminary 
agreement may be unacceptable to both broad parts of society and legislators alike and thus fail 
ratification, is quite possible. For these reasons, hypothesis 2 also was acknowledged as verified. 
Although throughout this study a rather analytical stance was maintained, a final judgment on the 
desirability of a certain level of transparency may be appropriate. First, it should be noted that certain 
negotiation situations indeed may benefit from the exclusion of the public. With elected officials being 
prone to posture in order to appeal to their domestic audiences, level I agreement on issues such as a 
peace treaty, an arms-reduction commitment or a realignment of borders may become fairly impossible. 
However, the EC would be well advised to negotiate agreements that touch upon to publicly sensitive 
issues such as far-reaching regulations dealing with IP law and the freedom of the internet though actively 
pursuing a conduct of transparency and inclusion. The earlier stakeholders such as the public, NGOs or 
Members of Parliament have the feeling that the agreement was negotiated in their best interest and that 
their concerns were taken seriously in the process, the easier the ratification procedure should evolve. On 
a final note, one of the core findings of this study is the increased role of the EP in the European polity 
since the adoption of the ToL. With the example of the failed ACTA ratification being one and the 
rejection of the US-EU SWIFT agreement in 2010 being another case where the EP found its newly 
established role as a full-fledged political veto player, observers of the European polity can expect more 
occasions to analyze the ways how the EP's new capabilities lead to new dynamics in the interplay 
between European political institutions. 
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Annex 
Annex 1) ACTA protest invitations in German cities – www.facebook.com 
 
City
Protest gegen ACTA - Berlin Berlin 9718 338799346153966
STOP ACTA - Demonstration gegen Acta in Stuttgart Stuttgart 7586 144489442335635
STOP ACTA - Demonstration gegen Acta in Düsseldorf Düsseldorf 6396 228942327190942
STOP ACTA - Ruhrgebiets-Demonstration in Dortmund Dortmund 5569 182716005161256
Protest gegen ACTA in Nürnberg Nürnberg 5356 244916202249229
Protest gegen ACTA - Leipzig Leipzig 4034 316277768408479
ANTI ACTA Demo Hannover (Zeit und Datum unter Vorbehalt) Hannover 3949 360437973983925
Augsburg gegen ACTA Augsburg 3734 245798608830506
11.02. - Anti ACTA Protest Bremen Bremen 3602 320064574703829
STOP ACTA - Demonstration gegen ACTA in Mannheim Mannheim 3526 267555573314186
Protest gegen ACTA Dresden Dresden 3129 155805177868102
STOPP ACTA Demo Köln Köln 3043 207644835998103
Demo Gegen ACTA Würzburg 2660 234203816662508
Kassel - Massenprotest gegen Acta Kassel 2584 320293564679124
ACTA ad acta! DEMO gegen ACTA in Regensburg! Regensburg 2584 100139926781604
Protest gegen ACTA!!! (Osnabrück) Osnabrück 2562 182606345180976
Anti ACTA Protest Freiburg Freiburg 2519 313894588647456
Protest gegen ACTA - Mainz Mainz 1878 169154469860540
STOP ACTA DEMO BIELEFELD Bielefeld 1792 231717836912664
Protest gegen ACTA in Aachen am 11.02.2012 Aachen 1768 290803420973299
Ulm 1729 199865750111770
Anti-ACTA Protest in Braunschweig Braunschweig 1634 297423820306461
Protest gegen ACTA - Münster Münster 1622 261880393883349
Protest gegen ACTA in Oldenburg Oldenburg 1497 347827715239385
Massenprotest gegen Acta Magdeburg 1340 104321526360193
Stopp ACTA! - Rostock Rostock 1046 337811569584831
Heidenheim 916 242282912517339
STOP ACTA DUISBURG Duisburg 826 360323100663808
Stopp ACTA Demo Bonn Bonn 823 123092011146059
Trier 791 216400925122310
Stopp ACTA! - Demonstration in Karlsruhe am 11. Februar Karlsruhe 724 163551970426885
Stoppt Acta! - Neubrandenburg Neubrandenburg 653 164327027014288
ANTI ACTA Protest in Ingolstadt Ingolstadt 626 239207726161954
ACTA Protest Minden Minden 603 310027772381359
Protest gegen ACTA CRAILSHEIM!!!! Crailsheim 538 241560099256920
Massenprotest gegen ACTA im Lustgarten Potsdam! Potsdam 518 350079258349898
Anti-ACTA Demo Hof Hof 485 235402929880096
Weinheim 300 101646299963355
Protest gegen ACTA - Konstanz Konstanz 278 137777673009011
STOP-ACTA Demo in Neuss Neuss 230 289961161066372
Demo gegen ACTA Wilhelmshaven 206 289837671077786
STOP ACTA - Demonstration gegen Acta im Kreis Mettmann! Mettmann 183 334580503240450
Auch in Annaberg - Buchholz gegen Acta demonstrieren! STOPP ACTA! Annaberg - Buchholz 160 229143120506127
» Wuppertal gegen ACTA! « Wuppertal 157 325185524190183
Protest gegen ACTA in Nordenham Nordenham 156 182942588474388
STOP ACTA - PROTEST GEGEN Geheimabkommen und Zensur Gera 147 223899837704637
Protest gegen ACTA - Frankfurt(Oder) Frankfurt/Oder 87 182685911831356
34 182716005161256
Total 96298
Title of event invitation „Going“ facebook.com/e
Anti ACTA Demo & Operation Paperstorm Ulm
STOP-ACTA-Heidenheim
Stop ACTA Trier - Gemeinsam mit ganz Europa für Informationsfreiheit!
Stop ACTA Weinheim
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